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Consumption and the Environment in Europe

5 Consumption outlooks

Chapters 3 and 4 open up a series of questions about the future, which stem from different interpretations of current trends and the historical forces shaping consumption and technology. Some of the most important are:

• Demography: Will birth rates continue to fall in Europe or will there be a return to replacement levels of fertility? Will immigration be allowed to increase? What will happen to the age profile of the population, and to the proportion of the population in productive employment?
• Technology and innovation: What technologies will underpin European economies over the next 30 years? Where will investment and product development be focused?
• Economic development: What will be the pattern of economic growth over the next 30 years? How will it interact with demography and technology? How will European countries differ? What will happen to income disparities within countries?
• Social structure: Will the trend towards an individualised society continue, with a breakdown of traditional communities? Will there be a reaction to re-establish social capital in local communities? What new social and political forms will emerge?
• Cultural values: Will the market ethics of the 1990s give way to a more egalitarian Europe? Will traditional hierarchies re-establish themselves? What new cultural values, narratives and practices will emerge? How will environmental awareness contribute? Who will be the culture-shapers of the 21st century?

This chapter explores these questions and their implications for consumption and the environment. It draws first on a number of economics-derived reference or business-as-usual outlooks for particular sectors, briefly reviewing their implications for the environment. It then explores some alternative possible futures, drawing on three storylines following themes from existing scenarios in the literature.

5.1 Economic projections

Chapter 2 identified food, transport and housing/residential energy use as the most environmentally significant consumption clusters. In addressing consumption outlooks, this section therefore focuses mainly on the energy and transport outlook developed by the European Commission (TREN, 2003), and on existing food and agriculture projections (IFPRI, 2001). We also draw on narrower sector outlooks, such as those for aviation in Europe developed by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO, 2003) and Eurocontrol (ICAO, 2002). Each of the outlooks makes its own assumptions about, or calculations of, population growth, GDP, commodity prices and other economic factors that influence consumption.

5.1.1 Demographic and Economic Outlook

The various outlooks reviewed here make their own assumptions about income and population growth. While some of them discuss issues such as migration and ageing as factors that help to shape consumption, their projections, e.g. of car use, are mostly based on assumptions about future income and price elasticities of car ownership and travel, combined with either assumptions or modelling results on future per capita income and travel costs. Detailed effects of different scenarios of demographic and economic change can only be captured by the modellers making assumptions about the implications for changes in the variables in their models.

The TREN outlook contains the most detailed economic and demographic projections of relevance to this report and the other outlooks do not provide sufficient detail – e.g. on household sizes – for meaningful comparisons to be made.

The TREN outlook for the EU15 countries is developed using PRIMES, an energy system model including modules to represent energy technology and markets in different sectors in great detail (Capros, undated). It uses exogenous assumptions about macroeconomic and demographic variables to develop detailed calculations of energy and transport technology stocks, their levels of use, energy consumption and environmental impacts. Accession Countries are modelled in the less detailed ACE model.

In the TREN outlook, population growth in the EU15 region follows the EUROSTAT base case projection and is assumed to slow between 2000 and 2020, leading to a slight fall between 2020 and 2030 to end up only 2.7% higher than in 2000. Household sizes continue to shrink rapidly; by 2030 the average household has only two occupants, down from 2.4 in 2000. This implies a 25% growth in the number of households with major implications for the amount of household energy consumed, and the number of vehicles and household appliances required.

Factors contributing to the fall in household size include the ongoing ageing of the population, increasing rates of divorce, and shifts in lifestyle, all following the trends of the last 30 years. In particular there is a growing number of single people, elderly people living alone, and of one-parent families. The rate of change in household size varies considerably from country to country, with the most rapid reductions in Italy, Ireland and the United Kingdom, and the slowest in Greece.

Figure 5.1. GDP per capita, TREN outlook

Manzos et al, 2003.

Economic growth assumptions in this outlook are developed from a number of existing projections, in particular those of the European Commission, DG Economic and Financial Affairs. Detailed qualitative assessments were made on a country-by-country and sector-by-sector basis. The projections assume gradual convergence of the EU economies with rising per capita income. The overall rate of per capita economic growth is higher during 2000-2010 than that seen in the 1990s, but it declines gradually in subsequent decades. Growth rates are higher in the Accession Countries than in the EU15. Consumption expenditure remains roughly constant as a share of GDP, at about 58%.

In the TREN outlook, the relocation of industries away from developed countries contributes to the dematerialisation of the European economy. Industry accounts for a declining share of GDP, with continuing growth in services, although this trend is slower than in the past. Manufacturing is based on increasingly high-quality materials so that smaller quantities can be used – for example with a trend towards lightweight cars. It is also focused on high value-added sectors such as pharmaceuticals and ICT.

In contrast to historical volatility, especially in the oil market, international energy markets are assumed to remain well-supplied to 2030, with continuing new oil and gas discoveries and advances in extraction technology. Oil prices fall from a 2000 level of $28/bbl to around $20/bbl, and then rise gradually through the period to reach $28/bbl again by 2030. As a result, there is little prospect for a substantial introduction of alternative energy sources.

The outlook assumes no new policies to address climate change or meet Kyoto commitments. EU15 emissions of CO₂ from energy use are 4% higher in 2010 than in 1990. In 2030, emissions are 19% above 1990 levels. To 2010, the emission increase is driven mostly by growth in the transport sector. From 2010 to 2030, the increase results from growth in electricity demand, especially for households and the tertiary sector (government and commercial services).

5.1.2 Personal travel

Long-term outlooks for the transport sector in Europe have been developed by several organisations. This report draws mainly on the TREN outlook (Mantzos et al, 2003), the IEA transport outlook (IEA, 2002), and the POSSUM scenarios (Banister, 1998).

The IEA (2002) estimates that cars and personal light trucks account for 77% of energy demand for travel in OECD Europe. Air travel accounts for a further 15%. Hence cars and aircraft together make up 92% of energy use associated with travel and these two modes will be the focus of this section.

Although this study concentrates on personal travel, both outlooks address the transport sector overall. In the TREN outlook, road freight overtakes cars as the main energy user by about 2020, but in the IEA outlook cars and light trucks remain the dominant energy user.

Figure 5.2. Comparison of projected energy use for travel, IEA and TREN

IEA, 2002; Manzos et al, 2003.

5.1.2.1 IEA, 2002; Manzos et al, 2003Car travel and energy use
During the 1990s, travel by car increased roughly in line with GDP. The TREN and IEA outlooks present slightly different pictures of future trends. TREN sees slower growth in future in car use than in the past, with signs of saturation in the distance driven per person. It sees accelerating growth in bus use and also some growth in rail use, reversing recent declines. It also expects faster car energy efficiency improvements than in the past.

Figure 5.3. Projected per capita car travel, TREN

Manzos et al, 2003

The IEA transport outlook similarly anticipates a slowing of growth in car traffic in OECD Europe, but also sees slower fuel economy improvements – indeed, it sees the energy intensity of cars and personal light trucks increasing during the next 20 years. IEA also sees slower growth in bus and rail use than the TREN outlook.

The two studies address geographic regions with slightly different boundaries, but this is unlikely to explain major differences in results. The OECD Europe region modelled in the IEA outlook includes the EU15 and the larger Accession Countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic). The IEA study appears to take greater care in addressing the gap between new vehicle fuel economy based on official tests, and actual on-road fuel economy. It anticipates that the gap will grow due to increasing use of air conditioning and other equipment in cars, following recent trends.

Figure 5.4. TREN projections of EU25 car travel and energy use, 1990=100.

Manzos et al., 2003

The POSSUM reference case sees car use increasing by 50% (1.6% per year) between 1995 and 2020. Energy intensity falls by 30-40% (1.4% to 2% per year). The outcome is a change in European car energy use and CO₂ emissions between -10% and +5%. Meanwhile, NO_x emissions from cars fall by 85-90% over the period.

5.1.2.2 Air travel
The IEA develops a projection for air travel to 2020 distinguishing between flights within Europe, and those between Europe and other world regions. It sees a near-trebling of passenger-km flown between 1997 and 2020 – a growth rate of about 4.3%. This is about the same as the growth rate projected by ICAO (2002) and Banister (1998). Manzos et al project air traffic growth closer to 4% per year for this period. Confusingly, the three projections have significantly different figures for base year kilometres travelled, and IEA and Manzos et al give little detail of the routes they include, or the method they use to allocate travel on extra-European routes to Europe, so it is hard to be certain how to interpret their results.

Table 5.1. Air travel projections, European routes, billion passenger-km
(ICAO, 2003)

Following the rapid historical energy intensity improvements in the aviation sector (Michaelis, 1997), the 1990s only saw a reduction of 1.3% per year (Manzos et al, 2003). Projected rates in the future are in the region of 2% per year, implying an increase in aviation energy use by about 2.5% per year and leading to a near doubling by 2020. Air transport increases its share of transport energy use from 15% in 1997 to 20% in 2020.

5.1.2.3 Environment and energy implications
In all of these outlooks, the transport sector stays mainly dependant on oil as its energy source. Oil prices remain well within their historical range and government policy is the main incentive for the introduction of alternative fuels, which is very limited.

Even in the TREN outlook, with its optimistic assumptions about energy efficiency improvements, transport accounts for a growing share of overall energy use over the next 30 years. EU25 transport sector (including freight) CO₂ emissions increase 30% from 971 Mt in 2000 to 1261 Mt in 2030. The transport share of overall CO₂ emissions from fossil fuel burning increases from 26% in 2000 to 29% in 2030.

In the IEA outlook, transport becomes much more significant as a contributor to climate change. In OECD Europe, passenger transport CO₂ emissions increase by 52% in a 23 year period, from 607 Mt in 1997 to 922 Mt in 2020. Freight transport emissions grow more rapidly, from 427 Mt in 1997 to 751 Mt in 2020. The aviation share of CO₂ emissions from passenger travel increases from 15% in 1997 to 19% in 2020.

In both outlooks, traffic and its impacts (noise, congestion, general deterioration of urban and rural quality of life) can be expected to continue to grow rapidly. However, emissions of local pollutants, in particular NO_x, could fall by a factor of about ten (Banister, 1998).

5.1.3 Residential Energy Use

During the 1990s, household energy use in the EU15 increased by 7% to account for 26% of total EU energy consumption. During the same period, the Accession Countries' residential energy consumption fell 12% as a result of economic restructuring. Manzos et al (2003) project growing household energy use in both regions over the next 30 years, to end up 20% higher in 2030.

Figure 5.5. Residential final energy consumption, TREN

Manzos et al, 2003

Over the outlook period, the residential sector has slowly increasing direct fuel use, with a continuing shift from coal and oil to gas. Electricity use continues to increase relatively rapidly. Within the household, there is a shift to cleaner and more convenient energy forms. Indeed, even including power generation, energy use is becoming cleaner with the general shift to gas. However, including emissions from power generation and district heat, the residential sector currently accounts for about a quarter of overall energy-related emissions of CO₂. Its share remains fairly steady over the outlook period and absolute levels increase by 16% between 2000 and 2030, in contrast with a 9% decline during the 1990s. Electricity accounts for a growing proportion of residential CO₂ emissions.

5.1.4 Changes in electricity use

Figure 5.6. Residential energy-related CO₂ emissions, including power generation, TREN

Manzos et al, 2003

One very detailed study has been carried out including a European outlook for residential electricity and gas use in lighting, water heating and appliances (Fawcett et al, 1990). They take 1998 as their base year. EU15 residential final energy consumption amounted to 2878 TWh in that year, of which 613 TWh was electricity. Lights, appliances and water heating accounted for approximately 520 TWh (Fawcett et al, 2000), the remainder being for heating. They estimate the breakdown as shown in Table 5.3.

Table 5.2 Breakdown of Household Electricity Consumption for Lights, Appliances and Water Heating, EU15, 1998, TWh

There are no Europe-wide projections available of the evolution of this breakdown over the next 30 years, but Fawcett et al develop an outlook for Britain, the Netherlands and Portugal, focusing on consumer electronics and home appliances.

Current trends in appliance ownership are expected to continue, with a major increase in electronic equipment, in particular associated with the introduction of digital television.

Table 5.3. Ownership of energy-using equipment in 1998 and 2020. % of households

Trends in appliance use are expected to include an increase in TV watching, but a decline in the use of cooking equipment and dishwashers as more food is eaten out of the home. Shrinking household size is a major influence on energy consumption. Hence the reduction in household size in the TREN outlook could be expected to contribute to growing household energy use. On the other hand, appliances are expected to become significantly more energy efficient over the next 20 years.

Table 5.4. Projected Improvements in Appliance Energy Efficiency, 2020 (Fawcett et al, 2000)

The overall effect of trends in household size, appliance ownership, appliance use and energy efficiency is that electricity use is expected to continue to rise in the UK, Netherlands and Portugal. Declining energy use for cooking and refrigeration is offset by increasing standards of lighting, consumption of hot water, and use of consumer electronics. However, the growth in electricity use is expected to slow from 2010 to 2020.

Table 5.5. Household Electricity Use for Lighting, Appliances and Water Heating, 1990-2020 (Fawcett et al, 2000)

5.1.5 Food consumption

While industry and retail analysts regularly produce short-term outlooks for food consumption in Europe, there are very few long-term outlooks publicly available. Those that exist focus mainly on demand for agricultural products rather than diets and the social and cultural patterns surrounding household food consumption.

Figure 5.7. Meat demand in Europe

IFPRI, 1991

The OECD Environmental Outlook sees a decline in the share of food and beverages in household expenditure between 1995 and 2020. Most spending categories (energy, services, motor vehicles and dwellings) grow by roughly 150% in central and eastern Europe and 60% in western Europe. Food and beverages expenditure increases by only 70% in central and eastern Europe and less than 10% in western Europe (OECD, 2001).

Figure 5.8. Agricultural commodities supplied in Europe, IFPRI.
includes cereals as feed

IFPRI, 1991

The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI, 2001) develops an outlook for agricultural commodities demand in major world regions to 2020. It projects a continuation of recent trends in the EU15. Food consumption continues to grow slowly. Meat consumption, which has stagnated in recent years, grows by 0.66% per year. The composition of meat consumption continues to shift from red meat to poultry, although pork consumption also increases. The historical increase in vegetable oil consumption is also expected to continue IFPRI does not give separate estimates of food cereal demand in Europe, but sees per capita cereal consumption in the “developed world” growing from 131 to 134 kg/year. As cereal yields continue to grow faster than demand, albeit slower than in the last 30 years, they see an increasing proportion of cereals being used for feed, and an increasing proportion of developed world cereal production being exported.

Table 5.6. Cereals consumed as food, developed world, kg/capita (IFPRI, 2001)

Note: European cereal consumption in 2001 averaged 133kg/capita.

5.1.5.1 Environmental implications
IFPRI does not explore the environmental implications of this outlook. However, the major issues include: continuing growth in grain-fed cattle farming, maintaining demand for high-input grain production with its detrimental impacts on soil and biodiversity, and high levels of fertiliser and other resource use; increasing meat consumption along with continuing nitrogen fertiliser use is likely to lead to a worsening of nitrate pollution as well as continuing growth in methane emissions; the rapid growth in poultry consumption has major implications for animal waste disposal and also for the welfare of birds. The continuing growth in calories consumed also raises questions about the health of the European population in the future, with increasing levels of obesity.

The European Fertilizer Manufacturers' Association (EFMA, 2004) projects a shift in EU15 crop production, away from coarse grains towards wheat. It expects fertiliser use to continue its recent decline over the next ten years, both as a result of reduced areas of land in production and as a result of efficiency improvements. The decline is expected to be largest in the use of potassium and phosphate fertilisers, and smaller in the use of nitrogen fertilisers, with increasing nitrogen application for wheat production.

The continuation of recent trends in both the OECD outlook and IFPRI suggests that food consumption out of the home will continue to grow rapidly. This trend offers opportunities for environmental policy and action – it may be easier for restaurants to adopt sustainable energy and waste practices than for homes. On the other hand, it may be associated with increased car use, and declining consumer awareness of the sources of foods, and of the environmental and social implications of their consumption choices.

5.1.6 Implications for consumption and the environment

The studies reviewed above are essentially projections in which historical trends are continued with moderate variations – e.g. in the rate of economic growth and technological change, in the price and income elasticity of food, transport and energy demand, and in price trends. They contain no surprises or sudden changes in direction.

The outlooks offer no hint at possible sources of the “factor-of-ten” reductions in resource use per unit of economic activity that have been advocated by some environmental experts in industrialised countries. Despite very slow growth in European population, household numbers are expected to continue to grow, maintaining demand for new construction as well as household furnishings and appliances. Energy use in the transport and residential sectors is also set to grow, with a continuing increase in GHG emissions. One area where environmental impacts could fall is agriculture, but any reductions are projected to be very slow, and the impacts of the rest of the food chain (not considered in these outlook studies) are likely to continue to grow with the shift towards convenience foods and eating away from home.

Where comparable projections have been identified, in particular for the transport sector, the studies reviewed reveal considerable uncertainty, especially in the rate of technology improvement. The IEA and TREN outlooks have quite similar projections of car and air travel growth, but the IEA outlook anticipates growth in GHG emissions from cars at three times the rate in the TREN outlook (1.4%/year compared with 0.4%). The growth rate for air travel is nearly double the rate in the TREN outlook (2.8%/year compared with 1.7%).

The outlooks reviewed here assume no new policies to address, for example, European countries' commitments in the Kyoto Protocol. Many of them include sensitivity studies, exploring the implications of higher or lower GDP growth, or different price or technology assumptions. However, they are able to explore the implications of alternative demographic, technological and economic developments only at an aggregated level, using the simplified representation that is possible within computer models. They do not address the questions identified at the beginning of this chapter about the social and cultural forces that underlie lifestyles and consumption. The cultural forces shaping society cannot yet be satisfactorily represented in computer models, and it may never be possible to do so. To gain greater insight into the role of these forces, it is necessary to turn to scenario analysis.

5.2 Alternative scenarios

Energy industry and many government energy analysts adopted scenario analysis in the 1980s to explore possible sources of future departures from recent market trends. Since then, scenarios have been used in a variety of contexts, including business planning, government technology foresight exercises, and in the exploration of strategies for sustainable development.

Environmental scenarios in the literature explore a variety of themes – shifts in government policy, public values, the geopolitical context, or other forces that could be part of different futures. These themes are captured in the scenario storylines – qualitative descriptions, which are sometimes used to explain assumptions behind quantitative scenario indicators. Table 5.7 identifies a few scenarios from the literature, summarising their main features and approaches to consumption.

Table 5.7. Environmental Scenarios from the Literature

Some of the most widely developed scenario themes are:

• A strengthening of governance, with effective market regulation and environmental regulation and charges. Such scenarios might be expected to incorporate moderate economic growth and environmental improvements. (GSG Policy Solutions; GEO Policy First; WBCSD GEOpolity)
• Political fragmentation (clash of civilisations), with slow economic growth and technological change, and poor environmental management. (SRES A2; variant of VISIONS Convulsive Change; GEO Security First)
• Globalisation with individual empowerment, linked to trade liberalisation, rapid technological progress, and communication/information revolution. Strong economic growth, environmental concerns addressed through technology. (SRES A1; VISIONS Knowledge is King; GEO Markets first; WBCSD FROG)
• Corporate power, sometimes linked to globalisation. Slower technological progress with companies holding on to ownership of new technologies. Fairly strong economic growth, environmental concerns not addressed. (VISIONS Big is Beautiful)
• Increased environmental concern, sometimes linked to technological innovation, sometimes to community building and localisation; often prompted by environmental disasters (SRES B1, B2; VISIONS Convulsive Change; GSG Great Transition; GEO Sustainability First; WBCSD JAZZ)

Most existing environmental scenarios appear to start from assumptions about technological and economic change. Alternative scenarios may explore rapid or slow economic growth and technological change. They may explicitly address more complex questions about the current state of the economy. Are we in the downturn of an economic “long wave” or does new technology promise the beginning of a new upsurge? Are we approaching a post-consumer phase of economic development? Will environmental pressures and regulation lead to a reduction in economic growth, or will they stimulate more innovation and accelerate growth?

However, scenario assumptions about technological and economic change also have to be grounded in an underlying set of assumptions or storylines about human motivation and its cultural and institutional context. Are human wants insatiable? Are people inherently competitive and self-interested?

The following sections briefly consider major questions about technology and culture.

5.2.1 Technology in consumption scenarios

Technology plays a central role in the sustainability of consumption. There have been numerous business and government foresight exercises to search for sustainable technologies (see, for example, OECD, 1999). Key technology areas relating to the consumption of food, transport and housing include:

• Biotechnology – including processes to reduce and remediate pollution, biodegradable materials, and genetically modified or selected organisms used in agriculture to reduce impacts of pesticide and other chemical use.
• Clean car technologies including alternative batteries, lightweight materials, direct injection engines and enhanced recyclability.
• Product recycling through advances in material technologies and new techniques to recover and reuse natural resources.
• Smart water treatment, through new membrane technologies and biological treatments.
• Smart waste treatment, including means of cleaning up hazardous waste, based on enzymes, catalysts, bioprocesses and other advanced techniques.
• Renewable and newer energy technologies, including wind, solar and biomass energy, cleaner fossil fuel technologies and efficient conversion and storage systems. (Fukasaku, 1999).

Some of the most widely mentioned technologies include GM organisms; photovoltaic solar power; fuel cells running on hydrogen; and lightweight cars (Stokes, 1999). Scenarios often feature the various promising technologies as solutions to environmental problems. However, technological development is fundamentally uncertain and the future performance and deployment of these technologies cannot be predicted.

This report does not attempt to review technology studies or to “pick winners” among technologies. Rather, it looks at the way technology can be incorporated into consumption scenarios, seeking to identify links between technology preferences and the social and cultural framework.

5.2.2 Culture in consumption scenarios

This chapter will mainly use cultural theory (CT: introduced in Chapter 4) as a conceptual framework for distinguishing scenario storylines, and to explore links to cultures of consumption and lifestyle. Figure 5.9 maps out some of the scenario themes mentioned above on the CT axes of group versus grid.

Click here to see Figure 5.9

Whereas scenarios often depict a world in which one cultural type dominates, the real world contains a mixture of types, as shown by Dake and Thompson's work. Strong governance may reflect a hierarchical cultural bias, but it may also emerge from an egalitarian democratic process. Globalisation may reflect the hierarchical power of big business, or the libertarian individualism of free markets and international networks. A hierarchical government or business culture may actually require a fatalist culture on the part of voters, soldiers or workers (Thompson et al, 1990). Individualism and the market needs a regulatory (hierarchical) framework in which to operate. Nevertheless, scenarios are usually designed to follow through a particular institutional logic or theme, and such themes can usually be interpreted using the CT framework.

The VISIONS scenarios offer some description of specific changes in consumption patterns and contextual factors. They address especially travel and energy use; technological shifts and developments; changes in market structures and other institutions; developments in social structure, inclusion and exclusion; and changes in public values and concerns. Table 5.8 below identifies the CT logic of the scenarios, and summarises their key consumption-relevant features.

It can be seen here that some of the questions identified at the beginning of this chapter, relating to demography, technology, economy, social structures and culture, could have a tremendous influence on consumption patterns and their environmental impacts. However, the VISIONS scenarios do not begin to quantify consumption or its environmental impacts, apart from indicating levels of renewable energy use towards the end of the scenario periods.

Only one of the scenarios, Convulsive Change, entails a significant shift towards more sustainable patterns of production and consumption. In this scenario, the change is the result of increasing evidence of the need to respond to climate change and other environmental challenges, early in the scenario period.

Table 5.8. Consumption patterns in the VISIONS scenarios

5.2.3 Potential for a shift towards sustainable consumption

The Annex to this report provides three scenario storylines which describe possible transition towards more sustainable patterns of consumption and production. The storylines were prepared as desk studies, inspired largely by the VISIONS scenarios and strongly informed by the individualist, hierarchist and egalitarian value systems from CT. Whereas Thompson et al see these three value systems as fundamental and invariant in the healthy functioning of any society, Beck and Cowan (1996) suggest that they are part of a progression of human civilisation and culture, with hierarchy, individualism and pluralism as successive stages within a longer chain. The tone of the storylines draws partly on their thinking in viewing Individualist Europe as a continuation of 1990s individualism, Traditional Europe as a reversion to earlier hierarchic values, and Egalitarian Europe as a progression, with the development of value systems that are currently emerging.

The storylines can be summarised as follows:

1. Cosmopolitan/individualist values. The individualisation process of the 20^th century accelerates, emphasising personal liberty, a high-consuming lifestyle, the development of personal capabilities through education. The scenario includes high rates of technological innovation and economic growth and liberal trade and migration policies, with any negative social and environmental effects addressed through market mechanisms.
2. Traditional/hierarchic values. International crises lead to a barricading of the rich world to protect economic and strategic interests. Democratic rights and values are eroded as big government and big business impose increasing control on everyday life. Technological change is impeded by restrictions on the flow of people and information. Economic growth is slowed by the high level of regulation and military spending. Income disparities grow.
3. Pluralistic/egalitarian values. There is a growing emphasis on stakeholder involvement and consultation, but government becomes ineffectual. New forms of community engagement grow from the grass roots, building on the trend in northern Europe in the last two decades of the 20^th century. ICT is used to build social capital and gives rise to new forms of networked community, placing increased emphasis on social inclusion and environmental values.

In the VISIONS scenarios, only Convulsive Change, which is the scenario most consistent with egalitarian values, shows signs of a major transition towards sustainable consumption and production. In contrast, all three of these new storylines are potentially consistent with a radical reduction in European CO₂ emissions:

• In Individualist Europe, the reductions are achieved despite consumption growth, through rapid improvements in the energy efficiency of technology. In this scenario, technological innovation is part of a buoyant free market system, in which governments play the crucial role of internalising environmental and social costs.
• In Traditional Europe, they are the result of economic stagnation and protectionism, with slow consumption growth, high fuel prices and a government-imposed adoption of nuclear power. In this scenario, emission reductions are not deliberate; they are the side effect of national security and protectionist policies.
• In Egalitarian Europe, they are the result of lifestyle changes forced by environmental and economic collapse. In this scenario, civic society plays a crucial role in social innovation to find attractive lifestyles and institutional forms that can enable people to meet their own needs at a time when government has become ineffectual.

Some of the outcomes for consumption patterns in food, homes, home energy and transport are summarised in Table 5.11.

Table 5.11. Food, homes, energy and transport in the scenarios

5.3 Implications for sustainable consumption strategies

The storylines discussed above are thought experiments that help to show how governments, business and civic society all have roles to play in any transition towards more sustainable consumption patterns. The nature of their respective roles and responsibilities depends on the scenario but in the real world all are likely to be needed, since the future across Europe is likely to include a mixture of all of the storylines, along with others not considered here.

At present, policy analysts mostly recommend strategies consistent with the individualist storyline – working with the market to encourage the development of new technology that will allow consumption growth to become sustainable. However, these strategies may not work on their own in a world where the reality includes a strong dose of the hierarchic or traditionalist storyline – regulations and clear priorities may be needed to provide direction in making consumption more sustainable. And there may be more effective strategies for working with communities and networks that are closer to the egalitarian storyline – essentially by making it easier for them to take their own initiatives, and encouraging others to follow their example.

Effective government strategies for sustainable consumption are likely to include price incentives, awareness raising and voluntary agreements with industry. But these are unlikely to be sufficient (Jackson and Michaelis, 2003). Sustained global reductions in resource use would require levels of price incentives that are currently politically unimaginable, although they might arise, as in these storylines, as a result of political instability or resource exhaustion. And the economic theory that advocates such measures as the most efficient way of achieving sustainability ignores the many other ways in which governments can engage in the processes that shape consumption.

Jackson and Michaelis (2003) offer six key messages for governments developing sustainable consumption strategies:

1. Current government policy presumes that increasing levels of economic consumption are a pre-requisite for improving the quality of life. Research does not support this presumption. The relationship between material commodities and social well-being is much more complex than conventional policy suggests. A shift in government policy would be justified to place more emphasis on other contributors to quality of life, such as health, community engagement and meaningful work.
2. Current thinking suggests that it would be infeasible for government to change individual consumer behaviours. Research does not support this presumption. Government plays a vital role in shaping the cultural context within which individual choice is negotiated through its influence on technology, infrastructure, market design, institutional structures, the media, and the moral framing of social goods.
3. Current government policy presumes that market frameworks allow consumers, on the whole, the freedom to choose the lifestyle that best reflects their needs and desires. Research does not support this presumption. Individual choices are constrained by a variety of social, institutional, and cultural factors. Consumers often find themselves `locked in' to unsustainable consumption. Government intervention is vital to facilitate change.
4. Society is becoming “post-traditional” with increasing questioning of values and culture. A variety of movements and networks have developed, in which small groups learn about environmental and social issues, explore lifestyle options and take collective action. These groups offer a model for change. Their scope to demonstrate sustainable lifestyles would be greatly increased by government policies to establish a more supportive context.
5. In this post-traditional society the government role is shifting from control to a “change management” approach, encouraging learning. Successful leadership in the learning process requires government to be willing to listen to others, and to question its own assumptions and practices. It involves ensuring the congruence of its visions, strategies, practical actions, and evaluation processes.
6. An effective government strategy for sustainable consumption will need to be developed on a collaborative basis with stakeholders. It will incorporate a wide range of measures. Policy packages might include: regulation and standards, qualitative guidance on sustainable lifestyles, codes of practice, market incentives, education, stakeholder processes, and the development of effective monitoring and indicators.

The outlooks and scenarios reviewed in this chapter show how the future might turn out if governments do not develop effective sustainability strategies in the near term. One way or another, it is quite possible that radical changes would be forced on European citizens, whether by rapid climate change, exhaustion of oil reserves, or geopolitical tensions. The development of a strategic policy approach is beyond the scope of this study. Rather, this is something that governments need to do in close consultation with a range of different stakeholders.

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