The Environmental Challenge of EU Enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe Chapter 3
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![]() | precise transposition of the relevant EU legislation(7); |
![]() | having in place the necessary administrative and other structures for implementation and enforcement. |
The applicant countries are also required to ratify all international conventions to which the EU is a party (see section 4.8 for further discussion on this).
Candidate countries have been progressing steadily in the task of drafting national laws and administrative regulations to transpose the EU obligations, so transposition is not expected to be an obstacle to early membership. However, the second element - establishment of a sufficient administrative capacity to implement and enforce the legislation - is more difficult, especially in the environment sector. Enforcement of environmental legislation was particularly weak during the socialist period. The rapid enactment of a vast amount of new environmental legislation is placing major burdens on the administrative capacity of implementing agencies and local administrations. This is an area where donor support and assistance will be needed for the years to come, and not only for the applicant countries in the second wave of enlargement. Even the countries in this coming enlargement are likely to need assistance on building administrative capacity and other implementation measures.
Post-accession transition periods for compliance
The EU recognises that post-accession periods of transition will be necessary for the heavyinvestment directives. Denmark, in line with several other Member States and the European Parliament, has taken the view that transition periods should be granted only in exceptional cases and only for short time periods. This applies to environmental legislation as to the rest of the acquis communautaire.
The EU has taken several non-negotiable positions with respect to the environmental acquis. One is that the applicant countries must comply with all Internal Market-related environmental legislation upon accession. This covers important legislation such as motor vehicle emissions, fuel quality, control over chemicals, and general requirements for waste management. Parts of non-market legislation such as nature protection are subject to a similar requirement.
Transitional periods may be considered in legislation where the applicant countries will not be able to comply fully with the requirements of the respective legislation on the day of EU membership, e.g. where financially heavy investment will be required or where immediate compliance would have unacceptable social implications. According to this reasoning, DG Environment has signalled the following acceptable and non-acceptable positions:
The applicant countries were first given the opportunity to request transition periods during the 1999 screening process. The table on the next page provides the transition periods that were originally requested (shaded columns). For the six CEE countries that have provisionally closed the Environment Chapter, the table provides the transition periods agreed with the EU as of November 2001 (unshaded columns).
As the table shows, most of the transition periods requested by the countries were not in the end accepted by the EU negotiators. Out of the 27 Directives for which transition periods were requested, but not by all countries, transition periods were provisionally agreed only for five - the Urban Waste Water Treatment, Landfill, Packaging Waste, VOCs Stage I, and Large Combustion Plants Directives. Whereas Hungary, Slovenia, and Poland were granted transition periods until 2015 to comply with the Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive requirements, Lithuania's request for a transition period until 2015 was negotiated into a transition period of 2009. Similarly, its transition period request of 2010 for the Packaging Waste Directive was reduced to 2006. Other reductions in transition periods were made for Estonia (Landfill Directive transition period request of 2013 reduced to 2009), Hungary (Large Combustion Plants Directive request of 2008 reduced to 2004), and Poland (VOCs Stage I Directive request of 2009 reduced to 2005).
In looking at the differences between the original requests and the dates actually agreed, the reader might well wonder whether these transition periods are based on real information concerning actual length of time needed for compliance, or whether they are more politically driven. It is quite possible that the applicant countries, in their original requests for transition periods, inflated estimates of the time needed to achieve compliance. But even allowing for this, the final negotiated transition periods seem unrealistically short. Moreover, it is important to remember that for all the transition periods not agreed, the applicant countries have in effect promised to be in compliance at the moment of accession.
The position of the Commission's DG Environment has been that applicant countries requesting transition periods must present supporting Directive-specific implementation and financial plans (DSIFP) to show how they will achieve compliance by the end of the transition period(8). In order to get a transition period provisionally agreed, the applicant countries have been expected to show that they have a serious plan in place concerning how they will implement and finance the necessary measures. This is to include careful investment planning, a process encouraged within the framework of the DG Environment's PEPA Programme (Priority Environmental Projects for Accession). The focus is on the activities to be undertaken during the transition period, rather than on the final date of full compliance. DG Environment has suggested that the following elements be included in the DSIFPs: introduction (requirements of the Directive and transitional periods requested), steps required for full implementation, strategy for implementation, financing costs of implementation, and implementation plan. The implementation plans will become part of the accession treaties, and will be monitored after the accession.
Table 3.1
Transition Periods requested and/or negotiated (November 2001)
As of November 2001, those countries which already closed the environmental chapter, i.e., Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia, had presented either cost estimates or implementation plans for the Directives for which they had requested transition periods, and some countries had presented both. Failure to present credible environmental investment programmes where transition periods were requested had, on the other hand, delayed accession negotiations for several countries.
In mid-2001, this strong emphasis on implementation and environmental investment planning appeared to be in danger of being shunted aside in the accession process. In the push to achieve the political goal of the enlargement, the Council and the DG Enlargement had reportedly become much more lenient in the signals they were sending to the applicant countries concerning their implementation of the environmental acquis(9).
The EU institutions have not yet clarified how they expect to monitor the measures taken by the applicant countries in the period leading up to accession and during the post accession transition periods, in order to ensure that compliance is achieved in fact. This is potentially a cause for concern, since once Member State status is achieved, the power of the EU institutions to bring pressure for compliance is more limited. To be sure, failure to fulfil a treaty obligation can lead to legal action brought by the Commission before the Court of Justice on the basis of Article 226 of the Treaty of Amsterdam (ex-Article 169), including the risk of significant fines imposed on a daily basis. However, this is a time-consuming and not always certain process.
The emphasis on the steps that need to be taken during the transition period, deserves the support - politically and particularly financially - of the Member States. In the period before accession, Community financial support will be limited only to the amount available through the ISPA and the Phare instruments. Section 4 of this report describes how both of these instruments have much more modest resources than may be forthcoming through structural funds after full membership.