Priser og risici på internationale markeder for de fleksible mekanismer Appendix C
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Final report
Mirjam Harmelink
Yvonne Hofman
Tuesday, 08 October 2002
M70057
by order of: Copenhagen Economics
ADB | Asian Development Bank |
AIJ | Activities Implemented Jointly |
CAF | Corporación Andina de Fomenta |
CDM | Clean Development Mechanism |
CER | Certified Emission Reduction Units |
CERUPT | Certified Emission Reduction Unit Procurement Tender |
CoP | Conference of Parties |
EBRD | European Bank for Reconstruction and Development |
EIA | Environmental Impact Assessment |
EoI | Expression of Interest |
ERU | Emission Reduction Units |
ERUPT | Emission Reduction Unit Procurement Tender |
ET | Emission Trading |
FCCC | Framework Convention on Climate Change |
GHG | Greenhouse gases |
IBRD | International Bank for Reconstruction and Development |
IFC | International Finance Co-operation |
JI | Joint Implementation |
LoI | Letter of Approval |
MoU | Memorandum of Understanding |
PCF | Prototype Carbon Fund |
PDD | Project Design Document |
The Danish government is currently investigating the possibilities to achieve part of their greenhouse gas emission reduction commitment under the Kyoto Protocol through the flexible mechanism: CDM (Clean Development Mechanism), JI (Joint Implementation) and ET (Emission Trading).
The Danish government wants to learn as much as possible from the already running initiatives in the field of CDM and JI, like the programs currently running in the Netherlands. This reports holds a short overview of the developments and experiences in the field of CDM and JI in the Netherlands and with a especial focus on handling of risks and the level of transaction costs.
The interest of the Dutch government in international projects reducing greenhouse gas emissions goes back at least a decade. Embedded in the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) was the agreement on the concept of Joint Implementation (JI), i.e. the international development of activities to reduce GHG emissions. This resulted in the establishment of a pilot phase for activities implemented jointly (AIJ), with the main aim to gain experience with these type of projects. The Dutch government supported Jointly Implemented projects and proposed in the climate negotiations to use joint reductions to reach feasible and ambitious greenhouse gas reduction targets.
Since CoP-1 in 1995 the Netherlands is testing AIJ. In total the Dutch government supported 25 projects under the AIJ pilot phase, of which 12 energy efficiency projects, 7 fuel switch projects, and 3 fugitive gas project (UNFCCC, 2002)1. The Dutch government supported the projects with a total budget of 38 million Euro. The pilot phase was the joint responsibility of three ministries: Development Co-operation, Economic Affairs, and Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment. To demonstrate that the projects in the pilot phase achieved additional emissions reductions compared to the reference situation without the project the Joint Implementation Registration Centre (JIRC) was established. This centre operated on behalf of the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment and was jointly managed by KEMA (a consultant and advisory firm with a lot of expertise on the energy sector) and Senter2 (an agency linked to the Ministry of Economic Affairs, which is among others responsible for the management of subsidy programmes in the field of energy and environment).
As a result of the negotiations in Kyoto, followed by the burden sharing of the target within the European Union, the Netherlands is faced with a 6% reduction target. I.e. in the period 2008-2012 the greenhouse gas emissions have to be cut by 6% compared to 1990. The -6% means for the Netherlands an allowed emission budget of 197 Mtonne CO2-equivalents per year in the period 2008-2012 (RIVM, 2002)3.
In 1998 the Dutch government started with an inventory of the efforts needed to reach this emission budget. This included an independent outlook of the level of greenhouse gas emissions in 2010 with no change in policy, and an inventory of possible emission reduction options (ECN, RIVM, 1998)4. The outlook showed that with no change in policy the emissions increase to a level of approximately 250 Mtonne CO2-equivelants a year in 2010 (see Figure 1). This means that a reduction of approximately 50 Mtonne of greenhouse gases needs to be achieved in order to reach the Kyoto target. The inventory of reduction options showed that the marginal reduction costs for domestic measure are relatively high.
Figure 1
Total level of greenhouse gas emissions in the period 1990-2010 without policy changes
and with the implementation of additional policies in the Netherlands.
The inventory was the main input for the Netherlands Climate Policy Implementation Plan, Domestic Measures (Part 1) (TK, 1999)5. This policy document holds the main strategy for Netherlands on how to reach their Kyoto commitment. Because of the relatively high costs for domestic measures the Dutch government decided that it wants to achieve 50% of its reduction through the implementation of domestic measures, and 50% through reductions abroad by means of the flexible mechanism: CDM, JI and Emissions Trading6 7. The 50%/50% split between domestic and foreign actions was the official negotiations position of the EU regarding the supplementarity issue in the Kyoto Protocol. Supplementarity in the Kyoto Protocol refers to the application of the Flexible Mechanisms to reach emission reductions, and states that emission reductions achieved abroad should be additional to domestic actions. The 50%/50% split was never officially adopted by the EU. The Dutch government however did officially adopt the 50%/50% split as a starting point in drafting the Netherlands climate change policy strategy.
In March 2002 the Dutch government published Netherlands Climate Policy Implementation Plan, Part II (TK, 2002)8. This policy document deals in more detail with the strategy of the Dutch government concerning the Flexible Mechanism.
Part II of the Netherlands Climate Policy Implementation Plan set the following generic
starting points for the further practical implementation of the Flexible Mechanism: In the early stages of AIJ the government focussed on Dutch companies, because the idea
was that AIJ reductions could eventually be distracted from companies obligations.
Two aspects made the Dutch government make the shift to another direction. The available funding for CDM and JI consist of clearly earmarked budgets, supported by
the Parliament (see Table 1). The budgets were set based on rough assumptions regarding
the average price that has got to be paid per tonne of CO2-equivelant9. Currently no clear earmarked
budget is set for Emission Trading. Table 1 Budget (mln) Responsible Ministry Joint Implementation ~ 384 mln in the period 2002-2007 Economic Affairs Emissions Trading Unknown Economic Affairs Clean Development Mechanism ~ 421 mln in the period 2002-2007 Housing, Spatial Planning and the
Environment In the Netherlands Climate Policy Implementation Plan, Part II published in 2000 the
rough outlines were set for developing Joint Implementation (JI), which have been further
elaborated in the past two years. Joint Implementation is the responsibility of the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
Currently the following tracks are followed to obtain emission reductions (TK, 2002b) Furthermore the Dutch government facilitates the process of Joint Implementation though
entering into Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with different Annex I countries.
Among others in the MoUs is laid down that a country wants to co-operate with the
Netherlands and is willing to transfer a certain amount of emissions reduction credits. 2.3.3 Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) As for Joint Implementation the rough outlines for CDM in the Netherlands Climate
Policy Implementation Plan, Part II have been further elaborated in the past two years. The Clean Development Mechanism is the responsibility of the Ministry of Housing,
Spatial Planning and the Environment. Currently the following tracks are followed to
obtain emission reductions (TK, 2002a): The CDM process is supported by entering into MoU with different non-Annex I countries. Due to the relatively high cost for greenhouse gas emission reductions in the
Netherlands the Dutch government already decided in an early stage to focus on achieving
emission reductions abroad. The Dutch government decided to: Table 2 provides an overview of the emission reductions that have to be achieved in the
Netherlands compared to the situation with no change in policy, and the tracks that have
been set out to reach the required emission reductions. Table 2 Reductions in Mt CO2-eq in
period 2008-2012 % of gap Budget (m1n ) Price (/t) per year whole period Gap with target in 2010 40-50 200-250 100% Domestic actions 20-25 100-125 50% N.A1 Flexibel mechanism 24.2 121 48%-61% ~ 805 Erupt 4.8 24 10%-12% ~ 3842,3 2 - 57 Other JI tracks (PCF) 0.2 1 0%-1% CERUPT 12 50-704 20%-35% ~ 4215 3-5 Other CDM tracks (IFC, CAF, IBRD) 7 36 14%-18% Emission Trading - - - N.A6 Total 44-19 221-246 93%-126% The previous chapter outlined the different tracks currently followed by the Dutch
government to acquire emission reductions abroad. One track the European Tendering
procedure for CDM and JI - is described in more detail in this chapter. In 2000 the Dutch Government launched the first ERUPT (Emission Reduction Unit
Procurement Tender) programme. The Dutch implementing agency Senter, who was also partly
responsible for the management of the AIJ programme, manages the programme. In November
2001 Senter launched the second ERUPT-tender. With the ERUPT programme the Dutch government aims to acquire ERUs generated through
JI-projects in host countries. These ERUs will contribute to the Dutch obligations under
the terms of the Kyoto Protocol. One ERU equals one tonne of CO2-equivelant. According to the ERUPT programme JI-projects have to meet the following minimum
requirements (Senter, 2001a)14: The programme does not state a preference for specific project types. The price of the
credits the government is expected to pay for the ERU varies from 2-5. 3.2.3 Procedure and programme
management The ERUPT procedure consists of two phases, a selection phase and a contract awarding
phase. In the selection phase project developers submit an Expression of Interest to
Senter in which the potential suppliers expresses its interest to develop a JI project.
The proposals are assessed on the basis of, among other criteria, the feasibility of the
projected GHG emissions reduction and the experience of the project developer with
specific type of projects. Items that have to be delivered with the Expression of Interest
are among others: In the second phase, the contract-awarding phase, the short-listed projects have to be
worked out in more detail. In this phase, among others the following items have to be
supplied: The Marrakech Accords provide for a 30-day period for comments on the Project Design
Document (PDD) from Parties, stakeholders and UNFCCC accredited NGOs to the validator. The
validator will have to make the PDD publicly available through the UNFCCC Secretariat. As
long as this is not possible Senter installed a special site: www.Carboncredits.nl. Senter invited all
stakeholders to comment on the PDD and all other project specific documents that are
posted. Senter assesses the detailed proposals on completeness and on the basis of the price at
which carbon credits are being offered. Contracts are awarded to the lowest price
proposals. The ERUPT Terms of Reference includes all terms and conditions pertaining to the
contract. The main issues are: Penalty procedure If part or the whole amount of the ERUs are not delivered on schedule, except in case
of force majeure, Senter is entitled to fine a penalty equal to 2.5% of the total agreed
purchase price per month of delay, up to a maximum of the agreed purchase price. This
implies for example that if a total purchase price of 1 million has been agreed on,
each month a penalty of 25,000 has to be paid. Apart from the penalty procedure
Senter has the right to reclaim any advances paid by Senter to the contractor. Monitoring reporting Every year the contractor has to submit to Senter a written report documenting the
progress of the JI project. The report has to supply the monitoring of emission reductions
according to the validated monitoring plan. In addition various issues have to be
addressed e.g. whether any proposed changes to the JI project are anticipated and whether
any side effects or bottlenecks have been identified. During the crediting period, per period of maximum two calendar years and prior to
April, 1st of the year following that period the contractor has to submit to
Senter a verification report. Delivery of extra ERUs If the contractor generates more ERUs during the crediting period than offered in the
contract, Senter has the right to acquire these ERUs. The contractor is obliged to offer
the surplus of generated ERUs to Senter at the market price at the time of delivery,
before it can do so to any other party. Payment conditions Final payment of the ERUs can only take place after delivery of the verification
report. The verification should be carried out by an independent entity (IE) accredited by
the Dutch Accreditation Board. Senter however, offers the possibility of pre-payments up
to fifty percent of the contract value. The pre-payment schedule will be as follows: 3.2.5 (Preliminary)
results of the ERUPT programme In the first ERUPT tender launched in 2000 26 project developers submitted an
Expression of Interest. Senter short-listed 9 projects that got the opportunity to work
out their project in more detail (Senter 2000)15. Finally 4 contracts were awarded, valid for 3.2
3.9 Mt CO2-equivalents against 26 - 33 million Euro. The credits were purchased at
an average price of 8.46. This means that a somewhat higher price was paid then
expected beforehand. More details on the projects that got awarded a contract are given in
Table 3. Table 3 Type of project Country ERU (mln) Total costs ERU (mln
) Price per ERU () Biomass: portfolio of 28 projects Czech Republic 0.5-1.21 4,5-10,8 9 Wind energy: 30 turbines of 2 MW Poland 0.58 5,4 9 Hydro energy: 55 MW Romania 0.61 3 5 Co-generation: 26 MWe Romania 1.54 13,5 9 Total 3.2-3.9 26 - 33 8.3-8.42 1
Emission reductions abroad must be cheaper then domestic emissions reductions. Emission reductions must be of good quality, i.e. emission reduction credits
will only be bought:
from projects of which can be expected that they
will be able to comply with validation and certification requirements, from Parties that comply with monitoring and
reporting requirements. The private sector must be involved, because the application of CDM and JI requires the
development of concrete projects, and the Dutch government considers project development
not her core business.
The governments believed that making use of flexible mechanisms does not need to be
linked to companies obligations. The government can have an independent role as
private buyer on the market. When the government planned to issue a subsidy scheme for companies the European
Commission advised to organise the programme as a European Tender, to prevent forbidden
State Aid to companies.
Allocated budgets for the Flexible Mechanism and the responsible ministries. Source:
(TK, 2002a)10, (TK,
2002b)11
44 mln in 2003 mounting to
71 mln in 2006
57 mln in 2003 mounting to
107 mln in 2006
2.3.2 Joint Implementation (JI)
The International Finance Co-operation (IFC). A
contract has been closed to deliver 10 Mtonne of CO2 emission reductions. The International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD). A contract has been closed to deliver 16 Mtonne of CO2
emission reductions. Corporación Andina de Fomenta (CAF). A contract
has been closed to deliver 10 Mtonne of CO2 emission reductions. Asian Development Bank (ADB). Negotiations for a
similar contract are in progress.
2.4 Conclusions
Set clear guidelines for CDM and JI. Develop different tracks to obtain emission reduction credits. Allocate earmarked budgets for CDM and JI.
Summary of Emissions Reductions that have to be achieved in the Netherlands and the
split of the reductions over domestic actions and Flexible Mechanism
1
NA= Not Available. No exact number on the budget for
domestic actions is available
2
Split between Erupt and other track unknown
3
Budget for PCF ~ 17mln. More contracts under
negotiations (e.g. EBRD)
4
Expected 50-70 Mtonne in period 2003-2012
5
More contracts under negotiations (e.g. ADB, private
institutions, bilateral agreements)
6
No target has been set.
7
Price paid in first ERUPT round ~ 8 tonne CO2
3 ERUPT and the CERUPT programmes
3.1 Introduction
3.2 ERUPT
The JI projects must be able to deliver a minimum of 100,000 tonnes of CO2-equivalent
per annum (i.e. 500,000 tonnes over the whole budget period). Delivery should take place in the period 2008-2012. The project would not have taken place without JI-funding. Projects should not have a large-scale adverse effect on society. Projects in the field of nuclear energy are not eligible for funding.
Annual account of the previous three financial years A certified statement of the suppliers turnover Project Idea Note (PIN) Letter of Endorsement of the host country Reference with respect to setting up and operating similar projects Reference with respect to the technology to be used Statement of social responsibility
Offer of Claims on ERUs Letter of Approval from the host country Business plan Baseline study Contracts between project partners Proof of all financial arrangements relevant to the project An environmental impact assessment (if required by the host country) Validation report
10 % after all conditions of avoidance in clause of the contract have been met; 30 % during implementation of the investment; 10 % at the moment of taking into operation of the investment, monitoring of emission
reductions realised and verification by and IE of these emission reductions.
Overview of projects that got awarded a contract in the first ERUPT tender in
2000 (Source: http://www.carboncredits.nl)
2 average weighted price for the ERUs
For the ERUPT 2001 tender 26 Expressions of Interest were received by Senter and 6 projects were short-listed. The emission reductions per project range from 0.5 to 1.6 million tonne CO2-equivelants with an average price of 4.8 Euro/tonne of CO2. Five projects are situated in four countries of Central-Europe (Estonia, Slovakia, Hungary, and 2 in Romania) and one project is situated in New Zealand. In total these projects offer 5 million tonne CO2-equivelants (Senter 2002)16. The project developers are currently in the phase of preparing their project design documents (PDD).
In November 2001 the Dutch Government launched the first CERUPT (Certified Emission Reduction Unit Procurement Tender) programme. The programme is managed by the Dutch implementing agency Senter. Through CERUPT 2001 Senter aims to buy at least 3 million CERs (Certified Emission Reduction units) from investments in CDM projects. One CER equals one tonne of CO2-equivelant.
According to the CERUPT programme (Senter, 2001b)17 the CDM-projects have to meet the following minimum requirements:
![]() | The CDM projects should deliver a minimum of 100,000 tonnes of CO2-equivalent over the crediting period. |
![]() | The period in which the CERs can delivered depends on the crediting period. If a crediting period of 10 years is chosen the delivery should take place in the period before 2012. If one, two or three periods of 7 years have been chosen, in the first 7-year period the delivery should take place before 2012. If case 14 or 21 years have been chosen, deliveries may also be supplied after 201218. |
![]() | The project would not have taken place without CDM-funding. |
![]() | Projects should contribute to sustainable development in the host country |
![]() | Projects in the field of nuclear energy are not eligible for funding |
Within CERUPT a technology preference is stated in order to promote sustainable development and assure a balanced project portfolio. CERs from renewable energy projects are offered a higher price than CERs from landfill gas projects (see Table 4).
Table 4
Maximum prices for different project types
Project types |
Price CERs |
Renewable energy (excluding biomass) |
5.50 |
Energy production by using clean, sustainable grown biomass (excluding waste) |
4.40 |
Energy efficiency improvement |
4.40 |
Others, among which fossil fuel switch and methane recovery |
3.30 |
3.3.3 Procedure and programme
management
CERUPT consists of two phases, a selection phase and a contract-awarding phase. In the selection phase the project developer submits an Expression of Interest to Senter in which the potential suppliers expresses its interest to develop a JI project. The proposals are assessed on the basis of, among other criteria, the feasibility of the projected GHG emissions reduction and the experience of the project developer.
Items that have to be delivered with the Expression of Interest are among others:
![]() | Annual accounts of the previous three financial years |
![]() | A certified statement of the suppliers turnover |
![]() | Project Idea Note (PIN) |
![]() | Letter of Endorsement of the host country |
![]() | Reference with respect to setting up and operating similar projects |
![]() | Reference with respect to the technology to be used |
![]() | Statement of social responsibility |
In the contract-awarding phase the short-listed projects have to be worked out in more detail. In this phase, among others the following items have to be supplied:
![]() | Offer of Claims on CERs |
![]() | Letter of Approval from the host country |
![]() | Business plan |
![]() | Baseline study |
![]() | A report concerning public participation |
![]() | An environmental impact assessment (EIA) (if required by the host country) |
![]() | A validation report |
![]() | Registration of the project by the Executive Board |
The validator has to put the baseline, the EIA, and the stakeholders comments on the Senter web-site in order to provide for the 30-day period for comments on the Project Design Document (PDD) from Parties, stakeholders and UNFCCC accredited NGOs.
The Cerupt Terms of Reference (ToR) includes all terms and conditions pertaining to the contract. The main issues are similar to those valid under Erupt. The penalty procedure and payment conditions in Cerupt however differ from Erupt.
Penalty procedure
Whereas the penalty procedure in ERUPT applies when less then 100% of the total amount of ERUs is delivered, in CERUPT Senter is entitled to fine a penalty if less than 70% of the amount of CERs offered is delivered on the agreed schedule, except in case of force majeure. For the penalty procedure it makes no difference if 65 % or only 5 % of the amount of CERs has been delivered. Similar to the ERUPT procedure, the penalty is equal to 2.5% of the total purchase price per month of delay, up to a maximum of the agreed purchase price. Apart from the penalty procedure Senter still has the right to reclaim any advances paid by Senter to the contractor.
Payment conditions
Payments will be made as follows:
![]() | on delivery of CERs in the 1st, 3rd, 5th etc year of the project being operational and generating emission reductions; |
![]() | on delivery of a monitoring report in the 2nd, 4th, 6th etc year. These payments will be considered as prepayments. |
In exceptional cases and only if proven unavoidable, Senter may make prepayments in the period of project realisation, i.e. before actual delivery of CERs. Prepayments will negatively affect the suppliers ranking. Senter will make a maximum of four prepayments, mounting up to 50 percent of the guaranteed contract value.
3.3.5 (Preliminary) results of the CERUPT programme
The first CERUPT tender was launched in November 2001. Senter received a total of 80 Expressions of Interest of which 26 projects were short-listed. The emission reductions per project ranges from 0.1 to 6.5 million tonne CO2-equivelants and the average price per tonne is around 5 Euro. The projects are situated in 13 different developing countries, with India, Costa Rica and Panama as the front runners. Most frequently used technologies are wind energy and hydropower. The project developers are currently in the phase of preparing their project design documenst (PDD).
Different kinds of risks are linked to project development and purchase of emissions reduction credits in the field of JI and CDM. Two types of risks can be distinguished policy risks and market risks, which affect three types of actors the host country, the investor country and the project developer. These actors have to evaluate their policy and market risks and need to develop strategies to mitigate these risks. The actors and type of risks are outlined in Table 5.
Table 5
Type of risks linked to JI and CDM projects and the involved actors
Actor ® Type of risk ¯ |
Host |
Investor |
Project |
Policy risks |
|
|
|
Market risks |
|
|
|
The different type of risks will be treated in more detail in this chapter and options will be presented to mitigate these risks. For the mitigation of risks we mostly look at the viewpoint of the investor country and refer to concrete projects or programmes as much as possible. It must be noted that this chapter only assesses the additional risks linked to the fact that the project is a JI or CDM project. Apart from these risks the actors will also have to assess the conventional political and country risks associated with cross-border investments. These risks include a broad category such as social conditions (labour, literacy, health), economics (growth, revenue generation, balance of payments), government (sources of power, regime stability), and climate for business (investment and trade restrictions, banking and financial sectors).
Policy risks refer to the uncertainties in the Kyoto process and its implementation in the international and national context. The evolution and outcomes of climate change policy is still subject to uncertainty, related to both the international agenda, such as the Kyoto Protocol, and to individual countries domestic implementation of the Protocol and climate change-related policies.
Developments in international climate policy: International policy risks are mainly associated with the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol is not a legally-binding document, until it has not been ratified under the terms of Article 25, which sets out detailed provisions governing the treatys entry into force. Lacking an operative Kyoto Protocol substantially increases the risks that particular project investments may prove relatively worthless.
Implementation of Kyoto protocol in the host country: There are risks associated with the host countrys implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, particularly the conditions under which JI/CDM investments will be allowed. It can be expected that different countries will implement their Kyoto ratification requirements in different ways, in accordance with their own national objectives and priorities. This could impact the viability of projects that fall outside those considerations. The Kyoto Protocol does futhermore state that emission reduction units from non-ratifying countries cannot be used to fullfill the Kyoto agreements. This means that investing in a country that has not yet ratified the Kyoto Protocol is more riskier than investing in a country that has already ratified the Kyoto Protocol.
The ERUPT and CERUPT programme requires that host countries have ratified the Kyoto Protocol or declare to do so in the Letter of Approval (LoI). Within the Prototype Carbon Fund projects are only eligible for funding if the host countries ratifies the Kyoto Protocol.
Host Country Approval: Both JI and CDM projects require host country approval. Getting project approval for a JI or CDM project from a host country normally requires negotiation with the host countrys JI or CDM focal point. The ability of host countries to enter approval procedures varies.
The Dutch government makes efforts to assist host countries in this matter by making framework agreements (Memoranda of Understanding or MoUs) with potential host countries. At this moment MoUs have been concluded for JI projects with Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Slovakia. For CDM projects MoUs have been signed with Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Peru and Colombia.
Within the ERUPT and the CERUPT programme host countries should approve of each individual JI or CDM project and authorise the supplier to assist in the generation and transfer of ERUsor CERs. The host country should also confirm this in the Letter of Approval (LoI).
Credit Sharing: Credit-sharing arrangements will be subject to host country criteria for JI projects. Currently few countries have such criteria in place. This means that each project is subject to contract negotiations for the credit split, until policies are established formalising a particular formula. Such a policy may well never emerge, meaning that all credit sharing arrangements would be negotiated as part of each individual project contractual arrangements, and in this will have to be clearly stated in a carbon purchase agreement (CPA).
Within ERUPT and CERUTP the Letter of Intent (LoI) also arranges the sharing of credits between the host and investor country.
Market risks refer to immature market status and a price risk for carbon credits.
Price uncertainty of emission credits. Even assuming the existence of a liquid market for emission credits there remains the unpredictability of future prices and market development, due to uncertainties in policies and strategies of actors on the carbon market.
Individual project developers can mitigate price risks by establishing contracts for fixed prices with buyers of credits (like the ERUPT, CERUPT, PCF) or try to insure their risk in the private insurance sector, which are currently exploring their possible role in the carbon market.
Establishing contracts with fixed prices is also the way for the investor countries to mitigate the risks of price fluctuations. Investor countries (like the Netherlands) establish these fixed contracts with the idea that the price of credits will go up when entering the budget period and that it is therefore cheaper to act early on the market. Of course there is the risks for the investor country that there is a surplus of credits in the budget period and that is would have been cheaper if they had just waited.
Credit delivery. Liabilities associated with credit quality and chances of delivery are likely to be assumed by the buyer as it is for other existing tradable commodities like grain, minerals, etc. The credibility and reliability of the seller will largely determine the credit quality, the price and chances of delivery.
Within the CERUPT and ERUPT programmes deliveries (timing, quality) are agreed upon in the contract between Senter and the project developer. Within these programmes there is penalty on non-deliverance of credits.
An assessment of the risk that the project developer and the key actors involved in the project will be exposed to is undertaken as part of the project planning process. Risk assessment is generally undertaken through the following steps:
A. Risk Identification: Identification of all risks associated with the construction and operation of a project. Typically expert risk analysts undertake this (often by insurance companies involved in the project).
B. Risk Matrix: Plotting of all risk categories against the various phases of a project. This forms the basis for the negotiations as to which project parties will absorb the various risks.
C. Quantitative Assessment: Evaluation of key risk parameters for individual JI and CDM projects. The quantitative assessment uses hard data, when applicable, as well as qualitative professional judgement.
The risk assessment methodologies are based on several parameters and can be applied in a number of quantifiable ways:
Absolute Risk is the product of {L x S} and is a measure of risk posed by a specific event without countermeasures being taken.
The assessment is modified to discount the absolute risk impact by a factor reflecting the intensity and quality of risk management currently applied by the project to avert the events occurrence or to minimise its impact. Therefore the following variables are introduced:
The level of Quantified Risk posed by each potential threat can be calculated according to the following formula: {L x S} x {P x MS}
D: Managing Risk: The risk that a project will not perform or under-perform can be managed through:
Different type of additional risks can be identified for CDM and JI project compared to conventional projects:
![]() | Identified policy risks are non-ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, uncertainties in the implementation of the Protocol in the host country, approval of the host country and credit sharing. Within the CERUPT and ERUPT programme most policy risks are mitigated through legal arrangements in the contract between Senter and the project developer, with the exception of the political risks that the Kyoto Protocol with not come into force. |
![]() | Identified market risks are price fluctuation and uncertainties in the delivery of contracts. Within CERUPT and ERUPT contact are awarded with fixed prices which rules out the risks of price fluctuation. Non-deliverance of credits by the project developers is covered through a penalty in the contract. |
This chapter examines the transaction costs of Joint Implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism for the investor country and the project developer. Transaction cost are defined as all costs that have to be made in order to be able to transfer ERU or CER from a host country to an investor country.
Not many data are available on the costs that have to be made by the host country to import emission reduction units. We were only able to make rough estimates. Currently approximately 9 people19 with Senter are working on the CERUPT and ERUPT programme, which roughly amounts to 1,5-2 Million Euro. In 2002 Senter is planning to buy 6 Mtonne of ERUs and 3 Mtonne of CERs (see chapter 3), which represents a total purchase budget ranges from 20-45 mln Euro (depending on the price of the offered ERUs and CERs). This means that the transactions costs for the transaction of ERUs and CERs lies in the range of 3%-9% of the total purchase budget.
Project developers will only consider a JI or CDM project viable if the costs of transacting the ERUs or CERs are substantially lower than the revenues they will generate through the sale of ERUs of CERs.
Table 6 shows estimated transaction costs for CDM and JI projects, based on numbers from ERUPT and CERUPT and on Ecofys experiences in the field. It must be stressed that the numbers are very rough and can only be used to get an indication of the level of these transaction costs.
The transaction costs in the in the project preparation phase include a feasibility study, preparation of documents, registration of the project as a JI or CDM project and the legal work for the contract. Total estimated up front cost range from 45,000 95,000 Euro. The total transaction costs in the operational phase are even harder to determine because none of the JI and CDM projects has entered this phase and no practical data are available.
Table 6
Estimated ranges of transaction cost for JI and large CDM20 projects (Euros)
|
JI |
CDM (large projects) |
||||
A) Preparation phase Once only costs |
||||||
Feasibility Assessment |
10,000-20,000 |
10,000-20,000 |
||||
Baseline, Monitoring and Verification Plan |
10,000-15,000 |
15,000-20,000 |
||||
Validation |
10,000-30,000 |
10,000-30,000 |
||||
Legal Work (contracts) |
15,000-20,000 |
20,000-25,000 |
||||
|
||||||
Total Up-front Costs: |
45,000-85,000 |
55,000 95,000 |
||||
B) Operational Phase Costs Annual costs |
||||||
Monitoring and Verification |
10,000 - 15,000 per year |
10,000 - 15,000 per year |
||||
Adaptation levy |
Not applicable |
2% CERs value annually |
||||
Sale of ERUs/CERs |
|
|||||
Risk Mitigation |
No information available on risk mitigation products on the free market. |
The project transaction costs may differ (a little bit) depending on the type and the size of project. E.g. Monitoring and verification of a large energy supply side project or an energy demand side management project may require more time than for a small solar home systems project. However in most cases a similar amount of work will be required for all the transaction cycle activities regardless of project size and type and thus transaction costs will be almost similar in absolute terms for both large and small-scale projects.
Eventually transaction costs have to weigh out the total revenues from the sale of ERUs and CERs. E.g. the revenues from the sale of ERUs of the 4 project awarded a contract in the first ERUPT tender range from 4,5 13,5 mln Euro. The up-front transaction cost then range from 0.3% to 2.8% of the total revenues. According to Harmelink et al (2001)21 project developers generally expect transaction costs to be no more than 5-7% of the net present value of the revenue. This means that the transaction costs for the large ERUPT project are acceptable for project developers. However for smaller projects with revenues from carbon credit sale below 1 mln Euros the transaction cost would amount to 5% and 9% and are probably not acceptable any more.
1 | UNFCCC (2002). www.unfccc.org (overview of AIJ projects under
the pilot phase). Downloaded 17-09-2002. |
2 | www.senter.nl |
3 | RIVM (2002). Environmental Balance 2002 (Milieubalans 2002.
Het Nederlandse Milieu verklaard). National Institute of Public Health and the
Environment, Bilthoven |
4 | ECN, RIVM (1998). Option document on the reduction of
greenhouse gas emission. Inventory within the framework of the Climate Policy
Implementation Plan (in Dutch). Netherlands Energy Research Foundation, Petten and
National Institute of Public Health and the Environment, Bilthoven. ECN-C-98-082. |
5 | TK (1999). Netherlands Climate Policy Implementation Plan,
Domestic Measures (Part 1). Tweede Kamer, Vergaderjaar 1998-1999, 26 603, nr 1. |
6 | In februari 2002 the outlook that laid the foundation for the
Netherlands Climate Policy Implementation Plan was updated. This update showed that the
emissions dont have to be reduced by 50 Mtonne/year, but with 40 Mtonne/year in the
period 2008-2012. With a split of 50% domestic and 50% emission reductions abroad this
means that the reduction goal for the flexilble mechanism becomes 20 Mtonne/year (MinVrom,
2002). |
7 | MinVrom (2002). Evaluation Climate Policy. Progress of
Netherlands Climate Policy: an evaluation for 2002. Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning
and the Environment, The Hague, The Netherlands, Februari 2002. |
8 | TK (2000) Netherlands Climate Policy Implementation Plan,
Part II. Tweede Kamer, Vergaderjaar 1999-2000, 26 603 nr 28. |
9 | Orginally the budgets were set in round numbers in Dutch
guilders, the somewhat odd figures in the table are due to the conversion from Dutch
guilders to the Euro. |
10 | TK (2002a). National budget. Budget XI. Housing, Spatial
Planning and the Environment 2003. (Rijksbegroting. Begroting XI. Volkshuisvesting
Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer 2003). Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2002-2003. page 137 |
11 | TK (2002b). Economic Affairs. National budget 2003
(Economische Zaken. Begroting 2003). Ministrie van Economische Zaken, vergaderjaar
2002-2003 |
12 | TK (2002b). Economic Affairs. National budget 2002
(Economische Zaken. Begroting 2003). Ministrie van Economische Zaken, vergaderjaar
2001-2002 |
13 | Results first ERUPT Tender 0,8 Mtonne/year in period
2008-2012, expectation 2nd ERUPT Tender 1,2 Mtonne/year, expectations 3rd
ERUPT Tender 1,2 Mtonne.year. |
14 | Senter (2001a). Terms of Reference for ERUPT (ERU Procurement
Tender - JI) |
15 | Senter (2000). 15 November 2000, News page
http://www.carboncredits.nl |
16 | Senter (2002). 5 June 2002, News page
http://www.carboncredits.nl |
17 | Senter (2001b) Terms of Reference for CERUPT (CER Procurement
Tender CDM) |
18 | In case of contracts also covering years after 2012
additional conditions are valid. |
19 | Phone call to Senter. September, 15th |
20 | Small CDM projects (< 15 MW) are allowed to follow the
short procedure. The procedure for small scale CDM projects is not yet clear (it is still
under discussion with the CDM board), which means that we cant give estimates on the
level of transaction costs. |
21 | Harmelink, MGM, P. Soffe, 2001. Financing and financing mechanism for Joint Implementation Project (JI) in the electricity sector. Paper written within the Framework of the JOINT project. Ecofys, Utrecht, The Netherlands, Ecosecurities, Oxford, United Kingdom. |